31st Annual Student Research Conference
Corruption and the Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes
David Reck
Dr. Michael Rudy, Faculty Mentor
This study uses large-N statistical analysis to investigate corruption’s effect on the onset of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) within a dyad. Corruption is used as a new measure of the contract intensiveness of a country in order to explore social market theory. In previous conflict research, social market theory has attempted to show how the development of contract norms in the domestic economy leads to trust between pairs of like-minded countries and allows them to avoid the onset of a MID. Since corruption at its core represents a breach of contract between citizens and their government officials, the level of corruption not only adequately measures a country’s contract norms but captures this more precisely than previous measures of contract intensiveness. Overall, the level of corruption within a dyad is shown to have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of the onset of a MID between two countries.
Keywords: Conflict, Military Interstate Disputes, Onset, Corruption, Contracts, Social Market Theory
Topic(s):Political Science
Presentation Type: Oral Paper
Session: 308-2
Location: VH 1010
Time: 1:15