Defense Pacts and Their Influence on Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Analysis
Sarah E. Backhaus
Dr. Michael Rudy, Faculty Mentor
There appears to be a divide in political science and international relations that has been ongoing since the creation of the atomic bomb: Is it better for every country to have nuclear weapons or for no country to be nuclearized? Faced with the facts that it may be unrealistic to expect that every nuclear power would dismantle its arsenal in the foreseeable century, political scientists have set to studying how to effectively limit the spread of nuclear weapons through the use of sanctions. However, there is a consistently occurring gap in the literature. Previous quantitative studies have failed to examine countries that are feasibly capable of weaponizing nuclear material, but do not. This paper uses a large N analysis from 1970-1990 and examines what possible factors may influence a countries choice to nuclearize by looking at those who have succeeded and, for the first time, those who have never attempted.
Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Quantitative Study, Deterrence, Sanctions
Topic(s):Political Science
Presentation Type: Oral Paper
Session: 11-2
Location: MG 1000
Time: 8:15